UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-25-2017

State v. Storer Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 44910

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Storer Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 44910" (2017). Not Reported. 3916.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3916

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

John M. Howell, ISB No. 6234
Matthew G. Gunn, ISB No. 8763
BARNUM HOWELL & GUNN PLLC
380 S. 4th Street, Suite 104
PO Box 2616
Boise, Idaho 83701-2616
Telephone: (208) 336-3600
Facsimile: (208) 342-3077
Email: john@bhglaw.net
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
SHANE MICHAEL STORER,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No.

44910

APPELLANT'S REPLY
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
Of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada
The Honorable Samuel A. Hoagland, Presiding.

JOHN M. HOWELL
MATTHEW G. GUNN
Barnum Howell & Gunn PLLC
PO Box 2616
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 336-3600

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN
Attorney General of the State of Idaho
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

..

PY

JUL 2 5 2017

EladonATS by

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Cases and Authorities .................................................................................................................... ii
Introduction

......... ........ ..... .. ... .. .. ... ....................... ........ ................... .......... .. ...... ....... ........... ........ 1

Argument. .................................................................................................................................... 1
Conclusion

................................................................................................................... 6

Certificate of Service .................................................................................................................... 7

CASES AND AUTHORITIES

State of Idaho Cases

State v.
State v.
State v.
State v.
State v.
State v.
State v.
State v.
State v.
State v.

Beebe, 113 Idaho 977, 751 P.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1988) ....................................................... 1
Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141,814 P.2d 401 (1991) .............................................................. 1
Chapel, 107 Idaho 193,687 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1984) ...................................................... 2
Hawk, 97 Idaho 1,539 P.2d 553 (1975) ............................................................................. 5
Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 115 P.3d 764 (Ct. App. 2005) ...................................................... 2,3
Ledbetter, 83 Idaho 451,364 P.2d 171 (1961) ................................................................... 5
Linebarger, 71 Idaho 255,232 P.2d 669 (1951) ................................................................. 5
Nell, 13 Idaho 539, 90 P. 860 (1907) .................................................................................. 5
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982) .................................................. 1,2
Weise, 75 Idaho 404,273 P.2d 97 (1954) ........................................................................... 5

11

INTRODUCTION

In its responsive briefing, the State engages in minimal analysis of Mr. Starer's sentence.
Rather, the State primarily and simply recites the "abuse of discretion" standard of review
undisputedly applicable to this appeal and concludes that no abuse of discretion occurred. The
State in effect treats the abuse of discretion standard as being impossible to overcome. The
State's argument fails, however, because the abuse of discretion standard is rendered moot if it
functions only as a "rubber stamp" of the district court's sentencing decisions. Afforded
discretion may, however, still be abused, and such discretion afforded the district court was
abused in Mr. Storer' s case.
ARGUMENT

A district court is afforded wide, but not unfettered, discretion at sentencing. A sentence
is unreasonable if it is excessive under the facts of the case and in consideration of the four
objectives of sentencing: the protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 146, 814 P.2d 401,406 (1991); see also State v. Toohill, 103
Idaho 565,650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982).
At the heart of this appeal lies the question of whether the "abuse of discretion" standard
of review constitutes a meaningful standard which, though difficult to overcome, is utilized in
limited and appropriate cases to overturn unreasonable and excessive sentences such as that
imposed by the district court on Mr. Storer. Or, is the "abuse of discretion" standard of review, in
cases of sentences within statutory maximums, in practice nothing more than a rubber stamp, a
hurdle which no criminal defendant may defeat.
The State clearly counsels the latter approach. First, the State wholly ignores the fact that
of the two defendants comparable to Mr. Storer, Mr. Storer received by far the harshest sentence.
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Those two comparable defendants received only probation and a rider; neither was sentenced to a
term of incarceration. Thus, based on this comparison alone, it is evident that Mr. Storer is a
sentencing outlier, immediately raising abuse of discretion concerns. (Confidential Exhibit

Presentence Report ("PSR"), Report ofAndrea Fielder ("Fielder Rep."), 14.)
Next, the State summarily notes, with no discussion, the highly significant fact that the
district court did not consider a rider for Mr. Storer because Mr. Storer performed too well on his
pretrial release: "The district court rejected retained jurisdiction as appropriate in this case ... The
district court's determination that it did not need additional information regarding Starer's
rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation was an eminently reasonable reason to reject
retaining jurisdiction." (Resp 'ts.' Br., 4, 7.)
The State provides no substantive analysis or justification regarding the reasonability of
incarcerating Mr. Storer when he did so well on pretrial release as to render a rider moot. As
noted by the State, the primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial
court to obtain additional information regarding the defendant's rehabilitative potential and
suitability for probation. State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 687 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1984); Toohill,
103 Idaho at 567, 650 P.2d at 709. There can be no abuse of discretion in a trial court's refusal to
retain jurisdiction if the court already has sufficient information upon which to conclude that the
defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation. State v. Beebe, 113 Idaho 977, 979, 751 P.2d
673, 675 (Ct. App. 1988); Toohill, 103 Idaho at 567,650 P.2d at 709.
Most significantly, it is axiomatic that "probation is the ultimate objective of a defendant
who is on retained jurisdiction." State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673,677, 115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App.
2005). See also Toohill, 103 Idaho at 567, 650 P.2d at 709 (Ct. App. 1982) ("In any event,
probation is the ultimate objective sought by defendants who ask a court to retain jurisdiction.")

2

Given that the unequivocal goal of a rider is to assist a defendant in obtaining probation,
it cannot be argued that a rider is an intermediate penal step between incarceration and probation.
A defendant who fails on a rider may expect incarceration, while one who succeeds may expect
probation. A rider is akin to a math placement test; score well and the student is placed in
calculus, while a poor score calls for placement in remedial algebra.
In this case the district court undisputedly declined to place Mr. Storer on a rider because
he did exceedingly well on pretrial release:
I pretty quickly decided that a rider was not necessary or really even appropriate in this
case. Often times that's to give people a four, six, eight month stab at getting started in
rehab and then you hope with probation terms they can continue. It seems to me that you
already got a good start at the rehab and I just don't think that a rider was necessary.
(Tr., p. 47, L. 6-13.) The district court, having concluded that Mr. Storer had already "passed" a
rider, or made so much progress that a rider was unnecessariiy superfluous, iogicaliy should have
placed Mr. Storer on probation because "probation is the ultimate objective of a defendant who is
on retained jurisdiction." Jones, 141 Idaho at 677, 115 P.3d at 768.
And therein lies the heart of the district court's abuse of discretion. Mr. Storer was so
successful on pretrial release that he was given a pass by the district court with regards to the
intermediate sanction of a rider. Instead of letting Mr. Storer then attempt the less harsh sanction
of probation, the district court abused its discretion by imposing the harshest sanction and
incarcerating Mr. Storer. Functionally, this was the analog of the district court sending Mr. Storer
on a rider, Mr. Storer completing the rider as successfully as conceivably possible, and then the
district court nonetheless imposing a term of incarceration in reward therefor. Returning to our
mathematics example, Mr. Storer aced the placement test, flying colors, but was nonetheless
punished by being placed in a remedial class.
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The State cites the premise that "[t]he district court's determination that it did not need
additional information regarding Storer's rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation was
an eminently reasonable reason to reject retaining jurisdiction." (Resp 'ts.' Br., 7.) This reasoning,
however, is nonsensical. If the goal of a rider is probation, then by not giving Mr. Storer a chance
on a rider, the district court had determined that Mr. Storer's was such an egregious case that, no
matter how Mr. Storer performed on his rider, the district court was going to incarcerate Mr.
Storer and not permit him to attempt probation. Bear in mind that Mr. Starer's two most similar
defendants received probation and a rider. Thus, the district court, although effusively praising
Mr. Starer's pretrial efforts, had already decided to sentence him more harshly than any
previously comparable defendants in the State of Idaho.
As the district court only ruled out a rider due to Mr. Storer's exemplary pretrial
performance, it is safe to presume that had Mr. Storer performed more poorly on pretrial release,
the district court would have afforded him a chance at a rider. In effect, the district court
perversely incentivized Mr. Storer to perform more poorly on pretrial release so as to be afforded
a chance at a rider, a less harsh sanction than incarceration. Mr. Storer was punished for his
successful rehabilitation efforts, and such unreasonable and unjustified punishment constitutes an
abuse of discretion.
Lastly, the State correctly notes that the pretrial recommendations are not binding upon a
district court. (Resp 'ts.' Br., 5.) The State misunderstands Mr. Starer's arguments and the
applicable standards of review. Mr. Storer does not contend that the numerous recommendations
of probation were binding upon the district court, but rather that the district court's unreasonable
and unjustified disavowal thereof constituted an abuse of its discretion. By simply noting that
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pretrial recommendations are not binding, the State advocates the "rubber stamp" approach to
affirming sentences falling within statutory maximums.
By taking this position, the State must necessarily agree that if twenty-seven nationally
renowned experts from all jurisdictions and backgrounds recommended a sentence of probation
for Mr. Storer, but the district court nonetheless chose to impose the statutory maximum ten
years' incarceration, such sentence would represent, by definition, a proper exercise of the
district court's discretion. In effect, the State is taking the position that if a district court
sentences within statutory maximums, then the sentence imposed must be rubber stamped and
the abuse of discretion standard of review is a nullity, a legal fiction. The State's counseled
approach would render appeals of sentences within statutory maximums wholly moot.
Such appeals are not moot, however, and there exist sentences that, despite falling within
the bounds of statutory maximums, constitute an abuse of discretion on the part of the sentencing
court. "[W]hen this court has found that there has been an abuse of discretion in sentencing, it
has not hesitated to exercise its power to review in that regard to reduce the sentences imposed."

State v. Hawk, 97 Idaho 1, 4,539 P.2d 553,556 (1975). See also State v. Nell, 13 Idaho 539, 90
P. 860 (1907) (Supreme Court held that a ten-year sentence for assault to commit rape was
excessive, and remanded the case for imposition of a two-year sentence); State v. Linebarger, 71
Idaho 255,232 P.2d 669 (1951) (Supreme Court found there were no aggravating circumstances
and held imposition of a twenty-year sentence under the facts there to be an abuse of discretion
and reduced the sentence to not exceed five years); State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404, 273 P.2d 97
(1954) (Supreme Court held the maximum term of imprisonment and fine for involuntary
manslaughter was excessive, finding an abuse of discretion in imposing the fine, which was
remitted); State v. Ledbetter, 83 Idaho 451, 364 P.2d 171 (1961) (Supreme Court in a case
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involving lewd and lascivious conduct with a 14 year old girl held a thirty-year sentence to be
extreme and reduced it to fifteen years). Such is the case here, as the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing Mr. Storer to a term of incarceration despite crediting Mr. Storer for
successful completion of a rider based on his exemplary performance on pretrial release.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, none of the State's arguments set forth in its responsive
briefing are availing. Mr. Storer's appeal is appropriately granted and the case remanded.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of July, 2017.

MATTHEW G. GUNN
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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